INTEL: a unique and well known brand for computer products. Is there anyone who doesn't know it? Still, Intel Corporation cannot stop any use of a similar trademark by others by calling upon this immense fame. This follows from a decision given by the ECJ at the end of November. An English telemarketing company had registered the trademark INTELMARK for its services. Intel Corporation proceeded against this registration, as the average consumer will, when taking notice of INTELMARK, have an association of the famous trademark INTEL. That could reduce the impact of the well known trademark, to the detriment of the well known mark. Sufficient to give INTEL a stronger right, Intel Corporation argued. The ECJ looks at it from a different perspective. If for the average consumer the later mark calls the earlier mark with a reputation to mind, this fact is tantamount to the existence of a link between the both trademarks. Yet such link is not enough. There must be more at stake for the cancellation or an order to stop the use of a later mark: the user of the look alike mark takes an unfair advantage of the use; the well known mark dilutes; or the use of the later mark is detrimental to the repute of the well known mark. In addition, the well known older brand is stronger in case of a serious likelyhood that one of these situations will occur in the future. Such situation cannot be assumed by the court, but must be proved. And that is a new perspective. A serious likelyhood: that in itself appears sensible. But there is a mean snake in the Intel judgment. The ECJ holds that proof of dilution requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered consequent on the use of the later mark. If the later mark is not yet used, a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future is sufficient as well. This evidence is not easily provided. How could it be proved that customers are behaving differently because of the introduction of the later look alike mark? Or is the later mark is not yet in the course of trade: that the behaviour is seriously likely to change? The ECJ leaves too much room for the user of the later mark to argue that such change of behaviour has another cause. The owner of the well known mark bears the heavy burden of proof. It is good that more clarity came over the rights that go with well known trademarks, but the owners of well known marks singed too many feathers.
Maarten Haak, trademark lawyer
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INTEL: a unique and well known brand for computer products. Is there anyone who doesn't know it? Still, Intel Corporation cannot stop any use of a similar trademark by others by calling upon this immense fame. This follows from a decision given by the ECJ at the end of November. An English telemarketing company had registered the trademark INTELMARK for its services. Intel Corporation proceeded against this registration, as the average consumer will, when taking notice of INTELMARK, have an association of the famous trademark INTEL. That could reduce the impact of the well known trademark, to the detriment of the well known mark. Sufficient to give INTEL a stronger right, Intel Corporation argued. The ECJ looks at it from a different perspective. If for the average consumer the later mark calls the earlier mark with a reputation to mind, this fact is tantamount to the existence of a link between the both trademarks. Yet such link is not enough. There must be more at stake for the cancellation or an order to stop the use of a later mark: the user of the look alike mark takes an unfair advantage of the use; the well known mark dilutes; or the use of the later mark is detrimental to the repute of the well known mark. In addition, the well known older brand is stronger in case of a serious likelyhood that one of these situations will occur in the future. Such situation cannot be assumed by the court, but must be proved. And that is a new perspective. A serious likelyhood: that in itself appears sensible. But there is a mean snake in the Intel judgment. The ECJ holds that proof of dilution requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered consequent on the use of the later mark. If the later mark is not yet used, a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future is sufficient as well. This evidence is not easily provided. How could it be proved that customers are behaving differently because of the introduction of the later look alike mark? Or is the later mark is not yet in the course of trade: that the behaviour is seriously likely to change? The ECJ leaves too much room for the user of the later mark to argue that such change of behaviour has another cause. The owner of the well known mark bears the heavy burden of proof. It is good that more clarity came over the rights that go with well known trademarks, but the owners of well known marks singed too many feathers.
Maarten Haak, trademark lawyer